TNI Guarding the Prosecutor's Office Considered in Line with Prabowo's Asta Cita
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.70062/dynamicssocial.v1i3.228Keywords:
Considered Prabowo's Astacita, Prosecutor's Office, Security and Law Enforcement, TNI Deployment, TNI GuardsAbstract
The deployment of TNI soldiers has sparked controversy due to concerns over the strengthening of militarism in civilian institutions. This action has raised alarm among various human rights groups and political analysts who argue that it undermines the democratic principles of civilian control over military forces. The Attorney General's Office (AGO), the TNI, and the Chief of Police have publicly addressed the issue, especially the deployment of TNI soldiers to guard the AGO Complex, as well as the High Prosecutors' Offices (Kejati) and District Prosecutors' Offices (Kejari) across Indonesia. The order for this deployment was issued in the TNI Commander’s Telegram Number TR/442/2025 on May 6, 2025. This order is part of a broader effort to increase security at critical state institutions, especially in light of recent security threats. The deployment of soldiers is part of a follow-up to the cooperation agreement between the TNI and the AGO, which was formalized in the Memorandum of Understanding NK/6/IV/2023/TNI dated April 6, 2023. The agreement outlines eight points of cooperation, which include: (1) Education and training for TNI personnel in law enforcement procedures; (2) Exchange of information for law enforcement purposes, ensuring better collaboration between the military and civilian law enforcement agencies; (3) The assignment of TNI soldiers to assist in guarding AGO facilities and other law enforcement offices; and (4) Other security-related assistance, such as providing military expertise to ensure the integrity and safety of AGO operations. While the cooperation between the TNI and AGO is framed as an effort to enhance security and operational efficiency, critics argue that this deployment could lead to the militarization of civilian functions, potentially causing conflicts of interest and compromising the impartiality of the judicial system.
References
Aspinall, E., & Warburton, E. (2020). Indonesia: The paradox of democracy. Journal of Democracy, 31(4), 5–19. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0068
Chaterine, R. N., et al. (2025, May 15). Reasons why the TNI guards the Prosecutor's Office, not the Police. Kompas.com. https://www.kompas.com
CNN Indonesia. (2022). TNI bantah penjagaan Kejaksaan Agung bentuk militerisasi. CNN Indonesia. https://www.cnnindonesia.com
Honna, J. (2019). Security politics in Indonesia: The military, democracy, and Islam. Routledge.
Laksmana, E. A. (2021). Civil–military relations in Indonesia: The politics of military reform. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 43(1), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1355/cs43-1a
Martiar, N. A. D. (2025, May 15). Prosecutor's Office guarded by TNI personnel, Attorney General's Office denies intervention in law enforcement. Kompas.id. https://www.kompas.id
Mietzner, M. (2020). Authoritarian innovations in Indonesia: Electoral narrowing, identity politics and executive illiberalism. De-mocratization, 27(6), 1021–1036. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1713738
Mietzner, M., & Aspinall, E. (2023). Democratic regression in Indonesia: Resilience and resistance. Pacific Affairs, 96(2), 215–239. https://doi.org/10.5509/2023962215
Oktafian, I. (2025, May 15). TNI guarding the Prosecutor's Office is considered in line with Prabowo's Asta Cita. Berita Satu. https://www.beritasatu.com
Prasetyo, A. (2023). Civil-military dynamics and public trust in Indonesia’s democratic institutions. Indonesian Journal of Social and Political Studies, 5(2), 87–101. https://doi.org/10.22146/ijsps.2023.153
Rahmawaty, L., et al. (2025, May 15). Attorney General: Synergy between law enforcement and the Police is getting stronger. Antara News. https://www.antaranews.com
RMOL.id. (2025, May 16). Lahir dari People, TNI firmly supports President Prabowo's goals. RMOL.id. https://rmol.id/Lahir
Robison, R. (2021). Reassessing the politics of authoritarianism and democracy in Southeast Asia. Critical Asian Studies, 53(2), 151–170. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2021.1911604
Setuningsih, N. (2025, May 15). Deployment of soldiers to guard the Prosecutor's Office: TNI's explanation, Attorney General's Office and Chief of Police's response. Kompas.com. https://www.kompas.com
Sherlock, S. (2021). Indonesia’s democracy in decline: Explaining the resilience of oligarchy. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 57(3), 321–340. https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2021.1971082
Sukma, R. (2022). Indonesia’s defense strategy and the role of the military beyond war. Indonesian Journal of Defense and Security, 12(1), 45–63. https://doi.org/10.22146/ijds.2022.887
Waku, F., et al. (2025, May 15). DPR will supervise the deployment of TNI soldiers in the Prosecutor's Office. Tribun News. https://www.tribunnews.com
Wiryono, S. (2025, May 15). New tasks of the TNI: Educating naughty children, planting soybeans, to guarding the Prosecutor's Office. Kompas.com. https://www.kompas.com

